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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
GROVE L. FLOWER, : Case No. 930566-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995), whereby a defendant in a 
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other 
than a first degree felony or capital felony. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of relevant statutes, rules and constitutional 
provisions are contained in Addendum A: 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in concluding that the State had 
met its burden of showing that Defendant/Appellant Grove L. 
Flower ("Flower") voluntarily consented to a search of the safe 
and that such consent was sufficiently attenuated from the 
illegal search? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves the "third 
category" of questions presented for review as outlined in State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1993). Resolution of the issue 
involves the "application of law to fact." id. The standard of 
review to be applied to the trial court's determination "is a 
determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for 
correctness." Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. A trial court's decision 
is given very little deference where the issue involves "consent 
to a search that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment." 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 938, citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1256-71 (Utah 1993). In other words, the trial judge's "pasture" 
is narrowed considerably when reviewing a consent issue, id. 
Any factual findings underlying the voluntariness and attenuation 
conclusions are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of 
review. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
On December 17, 1992, Flower moved the trial court to 
suppress all evidence seized from Flower's home and person on the 
grounds that the arresting Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") 
agents had violated Flower's right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. R. 22-23. 
The trial court suppressed all evidence except for the 
contents of the safe located in Flower's bedroom. R. 77, 301-04, 
312. Flower thereafter entered a conditional plea of guilty 
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), on 
August 5, 1993. R. 102, 105, 337-52. Pursuant to that plea, 
Flower explicitly preserved for appeal the adverse ruling on his 
motion to suppress the contents of the safe. Flower filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal with the Third Judicial District Court 
2 
of Salt Lake County on August 31, 1993. R. 114-15.x 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1953 as 
amended).2 
On December 17, 1992, Flower moved the trial court to 
suppress all evidence seized from Flower's home and person on the 
grounds that the arresting AP&P agents had violated Appellant's 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
1
 Flower retained Robert B. Breeze as his trial counsel. On 
April 3, 1995, the district court judge determined that Flower was 
impecunious and appointed Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to 
represent Flower on his appeal to this Court. R. 3 62-65. Current 
appellate counsel files this replacement opening brief pursuant to 
stipulation of the parties and order of this Court. 
2
 Flower was originally charged by a three-count Information: 
Count I, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent 
to Distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) (1953 as amended); Count II, Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1953 as amended); 
Count III, Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 
(1953 as amended). R. 8-10. 
After a preliminary hearing, Flower was bound over to the 
district court on Counts I and II; Count III was dismissed. 
R. 2-6. Flower was subsequently charged by the United States 
Attorney's Office in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, Central Division, with Possession of a Firearm by 
a Convicted Felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Count I of 
the Information was dismissed as part of Flower's plea agreement. 
R. 103. 
3 
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
R. 22-23. 
The motion to suppress hearing was held on March 3 0-31, 
1993. The trial court partially granted Flower's motion to 
suppress by ordering that the scales and marijuana fragments 
found during the protective sweep be suppressed; the marijuana 
found in the lunch box be suppressed; the firearms, marijuana, 
psilocybin mushrooms, money, and ledger found in the safe not be 
suppressed. R. 77, 301-03, 312. 
On April 29, 1993, following the suppression hearing, the 
trial judge signed Flower's proposed written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. R. 82-90. After the State objected to 
Flower's findings, the court held a hearing on July 19, 1993. 
The court stated that it had inadvertently signed Flower's 
findings and therefore set the previously signed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law aside and ordered counsel for the State to 
prepare new findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 333-
336.3 
Thereafter, on August 5, 1993, Flower entered a 
conditional plea of guilty to Possession of a Controlled 
Substance (i.e. psilocybin mushrooms). R. 102-03, 105, 337-52. 
The court sentenced Flower on August 5, 1993 to the Utah State 
3
 The new findings of fact and conclusions of law were signed 
by the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge, on March 14, 1994 and filed 
with the district court on April 1, 1994. R. 307-311. See 
Addendum B. 
4 
Prison for an indeterminate term of zero to five years; the court 
stayed the execution of the prison sentence and placed Flower on 
court probation for three years to run concurrently with his 
federal sentence. R. 112-13, 352-56.4 
On August 31, 1993, Flower filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal. R. 114. On January 10, 1994, this Court remanded the 
case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. R. 118C-118F. A copy of the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law is contained in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the morning of September 14, 1992, AP&P Agent Arthur 
Street received a complaint regarding a possible sexual assault 
by a parolee named Kevin Kelly, also known as "Spider." R. 206. 
Agent Street contacted Kelly's parole officer, Agent Steven 
Metcalf. The two agents then went to Kelly's home to investigate 
the alleged assault. R. 207-08, 249. Agents Street and Metcalf 
asked Kelly's former parole officers, Agents Hank Haurand and 
Karl Kennington, to accompany them to Kelly's residence. R. 127, 
171.5 
4
 Flower was convicted after a jury trial in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, 
for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court sentenced Flower to 
thirty months in prison followed by a three-year term of supervised 
release. 
5
 Mr. Kelly had reported to the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole that he resided with his wife at 4256 South 4940 West in 
West Valley City. R. 208, 249. However, it was later discovered 
5 
At approximately 2:30 p.m. on September 14, 1992, the 
four AP&P agents arrived at 4256 South 4940 West in West Valley 
City. R. 191, 193, 231. Upon arrival, the agents divided up, 
with Agents Street and Metcalf going to the front of the 
residence and Agents Kennington and Haurand going around back. 
R. 171. Agents Street and Metcalf knocked on the front door and 
received no response. However, within minutes, Kelly arrived in 
his pickup truck. R. 174, 209. After the agents identified 
themselves and the purpose for their visit, Kelly asked all of 
them to step inside so that they would be out of sight of the 
neighbors. R. 131, 151-52, 174, 209-10, 251. At that time, 
Kelly indicated to the agents that he did not think anyone else 
was home. R. 252. 
Upon entering the home, Agents Kennington and Metcalf 
accompanied Kelly upstairs while Agents Street and Haurand 
proceeded downstairs to conduct a protective sweep. R. 132, 175, 
212, 253. No agent mentioned any suspicion about the possibility 
of someone else being in the house at that time. R. 135-36, 240. 
In fact, there was no discussion between the agents regarding 
whether they needed to conduct a protective sweep. R. 133, 13 5-
36, 140. 
The agents entered a downstairs bedroom which belonged to 
Appellant Flower. R. 53-54, 92. Kelly never used or entered 
that room. R. 32-33. Agent Haurand did not see scales or 
that Mr. Kelly was renting a room at that address which was the 
home of Flower. R. 154. 
6 
residue during the sweep of that bedroom, and Agent Street did 
not mention such items during the sweep. R. 193-97, 218. The 
protective sweep lasted about ten minutes. R. 193. 
Over an hour after the sweep was completed, Agent Street 
showed Agent Haurand a set of scales with some marijuana residue 
at the base. Agent Street had found the scales alongside the bed 
in the downstairs southeast bedroom. R. 194-95. Agent Street 
also told Agent Haurand that some marijuana seeds, stems and 
residue were on the floor area of the closet immediately in front 
of a gun safe. R. 195, 214-15. Agent Metcalf later testified 
that Agent Street had reported finding "something" fifteen to 
twenty minutes after the protective sweep. R. 270. 
After conducting the sweep, the officers questioned Kelly 
regarding the occupant of the southeast bedroom. R. 219. Kelly 
stated that Flower resided in the downstairs southeast corner 
bedroom and would be returning from work around 4:30 p.m. 
R. 219, 232. Thereafter, Agent Kennington contacted the County 
Attorney's Office to try to obtain a search warrant. R. 220. 
Agents Street and Metcalf were standing on the front 
porch of the residence when Flower arrived home with his son at 
approximately 5:15 p.m., two hours and thirty-five minutes after 
the illegal protective sweep of Flower's home. R. 222, 258. The 
two agents approached Flower, with Agent Metcalf identifying 
himself and the reasons for the AP&P agents' presence. R. 222, 
232, 259. Agent Metcalf informed Flower that the agents had 
found scales, seeds and marijuana residue in his bedroom and then 
7 
stated, "I would sure like to know what was in that safe." 
R. 223, 232-33, 259. Flower testified that upon being approached 
by the agents, he felt like he was not free to leave (R. 288); 
the agents confirmed the fact that he could not have just walked 
away. R. 233. 
Flower responded to Agent Metcalf s request by saying 
something to the effect that there is an eighth ounce of 
marijuana and some guns. R. 222, 259. Agent Metcalf then asked 
Appellant for permission to search inside the safe. Flower 
responded by saying, "yeah." R. 224, 260. 
Agent Metcalf next conducted a frisk of Flower for 
weapons. R. 223, 261. Flower placed the lunch pail he was 
carrying on the hood of the truck by which he was standing. 
R. 223, 264. When Flower's son reached for the lunch pail, 
Flower told the boy "no" and moved the lunch pail out of the 
child's reach. R. 224-25, 261-62. Agent Metcalf picked up the 
lunch pail and asked Flower what was inside. R. 266. Flower 
responded, "It's pot, man." R. 225, 262. Agent Metcalf opened 
the lunch pail and saw a bag containing approximately one-half 
pound of marijuana. R. 225, 262-63. 
Flower was placed under arrest and taken into the home. 
R. 225, 263. When the agents and Flower were in the kitchen, 
Agent Street read Flower his Miranda rights. R. 226, 263-64. 
Flower invoked his right to silence. R. 226, 263-64. Agent 
Street asked Flower if they could still search the safe, and 
Flower responded by saying, "yes." R. 142, 226. Flower, who was 
8 
handcuffed behind his back, reached around and partially removed 
the keys from his front pocket, at which point Agent Street 
further removed and took possession of the keys. R. 226-27, 230-
31, 265.6 
On December 17, 1992, Flower moved the district court to 
suppress all evidence seized from Flower's home, safe and person 
on the grounds that the arresting AP&P agents had violated 
Flower's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
R. 22-23. 
At the suppression hearing on March 30-31, 1993, the 
district court judge partially granted Flower's motion to 
suppress by ordering that the scales and marijuana fragments 
found during the protective sweep be suppressed; the marijuana 
found in the lunch box be suppressed; the firearms, marijuana, 
psilocybin mushrooms, money, and ledger found in the safe not be 
suppressed. R. 77, 301-03, 312. 
On March 14, 1994, the district court judge signed the 
following conclusions of law: 
1. The Court finds that the officers did 
not have reasonable suspicion to believe that 
there was another individual in the house which 
posed a danger to them and therefore the 
protective sweep was not justified. The scales 
6
 Upon searching the safe, Agent Street found two guns, a 
small quantity of marijuana, psilocybin mushrooms, money, and a 
ledger. R. 227-228. 
9 
and marijuana fragments found during the 
protective sweep are suppressed. 
2. The officers' search of the 
defendant's lunch box was not a valid Terry 
search nor was it a valid search incident to 
arrest. The contents of the lunch box are 
suppressed. 
3. The initial consent given by the 
defendant to search the safe when he was 
contacted in the front yard of the house was 
sufficiently attenuated from the protective sweep 
and was voluntary. The subsequent consent given 
by the defendant after his arrest and after his 
Miranda rights had been given to him was 
attenuated from the protective sweep and was 
voluntary. The search of the safe was a valid 
consent search and the contents of the safe are 
not suppressed. 
R. 310-11. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that the State had 
met its burden of showing that Flower voluntarily consented to a 
search of the safe and that such consent was sufficiently 
attenuated from the illegal sweep and illegal search of the lunch 
box. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT'S CONSENT TO 
SEARCH THE SAFE WAS VOLUNTARY AND SUFFICIENTLY 
ATTENUATED FROM THE ILLEGALITY. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees every citizen the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
10 
Constitution also provides a similar right.7 A search conducted 
pursuant to consent is one of the specifically established 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause 
requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973) . 
A. FLOWER'S CONSENT TO SEARCH THE SAFE WAS NOT 
VOLUNTARILY GIVEN. 
In State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court set out a two-prong test to be used in determining 
whether or not a person's consent to search following police 
misconduct was lawfully obtained and therefore not violative of 
the Fourth Amendment: (1) The consent must be given voluntarily; 
and (2) the consent must not be obtained by police exploitation 
of the prior illegality. Id. at 688; see State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993); 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 8.2(d) at 190 (2d ed. 1987). 
The first prong of the Arroyo test requires that consent 
be voluntary in order to be valid. If the consent is not 
voluntary, no further inquiry is required; the evidence is 
suppressed. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688; see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 
218. "Whether the requisite voluntariness exists depends on 'the 
totality of all the surrounding circumstances--both the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of7 police 
7
 Flower does not make a separate argument under Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitut ion but relies solely on the 
protection guaranteed him under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
11 
conduct." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 
at 226). Included in the totality of the circumstances are 
"subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly 
vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents." 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229. 
It is also well settled that the prosecution bears the 
burden of proving that the defendant's consent was voluntary. 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990); United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 577 (1980). The Arroyo court stated 
that since consent is an exception to the warrant requirement, 
the burden is on the government to show that the search was 
voluntary. In proving the exception, the prosecution has a much 
heavier burden to satisfy than when proving consent to search 
which does not follow police misconduct. Id. at 687-688. 
In evaluating whether a conclusion of voluntariness 
should be overturned on appeal, the reviewing court must engage 
in the following analysis to ensure the State has met its burden: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony 
that the consent was "unequivocal and specific" 
and "freely and intelligently given"; (2) the 
government must prove consent was given without 
duress or coercion, express or implied; and 
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be 
convincing evidence that such rights were waived. 
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (quoting United States v. 
Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977)). "In addition, 
factors indicating a lack of coercion in obtaining consent are 
12 
the officer's lack of a claim of authority to search,' 'the 
absence of an exhibition of force' by the officer, the officers 
'mere request to search,' 'cooperation' by the defendant, and the 
officer's lack of 'deception.'" State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913 
(Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 
(Utah 1980)) . 
The trial court determined that Flower consented to a 
search of the safe. R. 296, 299, 310.8 The trial court did not 
8
 The findings and conclusions drafted by the prosecutor 
include conclusions that the initial and subsequent consent were 
voluntary and attenuated. R. 310. The trial judge did not make 
such determinations in his oral ruling. Instead, the trial judge 
stated that Flower "gave his consent, after having his rights read 
to him, to go into the safe." R. 299. When the prosecutor argued 
that an earlier consent had occurred outside, the judge stated, 
" [b] ut the critical time is after Miranda. The rights were read to 
him and then he consented to the search." R. 296. 
In addition, the trial judge apparently disregarded the 
attenuation prong. When defense counsel attempted to argue that 
the consent was not attenuated from the prior illegality, the trial 
judge interrupted, stating: 
I don't agree with that philosophy. As heretofore 
stated, the defendant in this case gave his 
consent, after having his rights read to him, to 
go into the safe. 
R. 299. This suggests that the trial judge failed to make the 
required attenuation analysis even though such a determination 
appears in the counsel drafted findings and conclusions. 
In his concurring opinion in Automatic Control Products 
Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 780 P.2d 1258, 1263-64 (Utah 1989) 
(Zimmerman, J. concurring), Justice Zimmerman indicated that in 
some circumstances, counsel drafted findings should be given less 
weight than judge drafted findings. Justice Zimmerman recognized 
that counsel drafted findings pose a danger that counsel will 
"inject findings that may not be entirely in conformity with the 
judge's views or that may deal with issues the judge has not even 
thought about." Id. In the present case, the counsel drafted 
findings injected findings such as those criticized by Justice 
Zimmerman. The trial judge rejected the initial "consent" as the 
13 
state on the record nor include in the findings and conclusions 
the basis for its legal conclusion. Nonetheless, under the 
circumstances of this case, this Court is in a position to 
determine whether the State has met its burden of proof as to 
voluntariness. State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 
1990) . 
A review of the circumstances establishes that the State 
failed to meet its burden of showing that Flower voluntarily 
consented to a search of the safe. While in the front yard 
immediately after arriving at home, Flower responded that the 
officers could search the safe. R. 222, 258. Two of the four 
AP&P agents who were at Flower's home approached him when he 
arrived. Agent Metcalf immediately informed Flower that they had 
found marijuana residue and scales in his bedroom. R. 223, 
basis for his determination and apparently did not conduct an 
attenuation analysis. As Justice Zimmerman further noted in 
Automatic Control Products, 
11
 [F] indings of fact prepared by the court are 
'drawn with the insight of a disinterested mind' 
and are 'more helpful to the appellate court' than 
those prepared by counsel." United States v. 
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656, 84 
S.Ct. 1044, 1047, 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964). It is for 
this reason that the federal courts appear to have 
almost uniformly adopted the rule that while 
findings prepared by counsel are sufficient ... , 
appellate courts 'will feel freer in close cases 
to disregard a finding or remand for further 
findings if the trial court did not prepare them 
him[or her]self.'" [citations omitted] 
Id. at 1264. 
In the present case, this Court should feel free to 
disregard the counsel drafted conclusions regarding attenuation and 
the voluntariness of the initial consent. 
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232-33, 259. Flower did not feel free to leave. The agents 
confirmed that they would not have permitted Flower to walk away 
and that Flower was a suspect. R. 232, 233, 288. Agent Metcalf 
asked Flower, "I would sure like to know what was in that safe." 
R. 223, 232, 259. Flower responded truthfully by saying that 
some marijuana and guns were inside. R. 222, 259. Agent Metcalf 
asked for permission to search the safe and Flower responded, 
"yeah." R. 224, 260. 
This first "consent" was not freely and intelligently 
given without any express or implied duress or coercion. There 
was an undue show of authority when Flower arrived home to find 
four AP&P agents present. The ensuing actions and statements by 
the officers implied that Flower was a suspect who was in police 
custody. Although the agents did not arrest Flower until after 
the illegal search of the lunch pail, Flower was in "custody" 
pursuant to the factors outlined in State v. Mirquet, 268 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1992) .9 The fact that Flower was in custody 
is a relevant factor to be considered in a voluntariness 
determination. Webb, 790 P.2d at 65. In addition, the failure 
to give Miranda warnings prior to this initial request for 
9
 Factors (2) , (3) and (4) all weigh in favor of a 
determination that Flower was in custody. See Mirquet, 268 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 4. The investigation had focused on Flower, and the 
objective indicia of arrest were present in that Flower was told 
that officers had found illegal contraband in his room and he was 
not free to leave. In addition, the form of the interrogation, 
where officers initially informed Flower they had found illegal 
contraband in this room, shows that he was in custody prior to the 
first response that officers could search the safe. The failure of 
the agents to Mirandize Flower at this point is also a factor 
weighing against the voluntariness of any "consent" to search. 
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consent is another factor weighing against the voluntariness of 
the consent. See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 
1990). 
Agent Metcalf's statement that he wanted to know what was 
in the safe coupled with other factors including the agent's 
failure to inform Flower that he could refuse to consent to a 
search, created a coercive atmosphere which would cause any 
reasonable person to submit to the officer's show of authority. 
See Webb, 790 P.2d at 82 (court considered fact that police 
indicated that individual could refuse to consent). 
Flower responded that the officers could search the safe 
after he was placed under arrest. The agents took Flower into 
the kitchen of his home where they Mirandized him. R. 225, 263-
64, 276. Flower immediately invoked his right to silence. 
R. 226, 263-64. After Flower invoked his right to silence, Agent 
Street asked Flower "if he was still willing to consent to a 
search of that safe." R. 226. Flower responded, "yes." R. 142, 
226. Flower, who was handcuffed behind his back, reached around 
and partially removed the keys from his front pocket. At that 
point, Agent Street further removed and took possession of the 
keys. R. 226-27, 230-31, 265.10 
10
 There was conflicting testimony as to whether Flower or 
Agent Street actually removed the keys or whether Agent Street 
helped Appellant remove the keys. The counsel-drafted findings 
state that "reached into his pocket to retrieve a key to the safe." 
R. 310. However, the trial court judge found at the motion to 
suppress hearing that "he [Flower] reached in and got them [the 
keys] partially out of his pocket and then they [the agents] got 
them the rest of the way out. The officers assisted in taking the 
keys out." R. 296. This latter finding should control these 
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This second affirmative response to a request to search 
the safe did not constitute a voluntary consent to search. The 
agents had officially placed Flower under arrest, handcuffed him 
and taken him into the kitchen of his home. Three of the four 
AP&P agents who were at the home were in the kitchen with Flower. 
Flower invoked his right to silence. R. 226. Flower had already 
involuntarily consented to a search of the safe. His 
acquiescence to a search of the safe under these circumstances 
did not constitute a voluntary consent to search. 
As a parolee who had just been placed under arrest, 
Appellant merely acquiesced in the will of the agents. The State 
presented no evidence indicating that Flower was aware of his 
right to refuse to consent or that he had any choice other than 
to acquiesce. The agents never asked Flower to sign or read any 
type of waiver or consent to search form. Flower's young child 
was present and witnessed at least a portion of the interaction. 
The totality of circumstances merely indicates that Flower, a 
parolee, was being obedient to four parole officers who waited 
over two hours for him to return and who indicated upon Flower's 
arrival that they had found scales and drug residue in his room. 
The circumstances in this case contrast with the second 
consent in Thurman which the Utah Supreme Court concluded was 
voluntary. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1273. The second Thurman 
consent was given in a calm atmosphere, "far removed from the 
proceedings. See Automatic Control Products, 780 P. 2d at 1264 
(Zimmerman, J. concurring). 
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events of that morning." Id. Officers gave Thurman the Miranda 
warning twice and Thurman agreed to talk with officers, unlike 
the current case where Flower exercised his right to silence. 
Unlike Flower, Thurman was not in handcuffs, was free to move 
around, and opened the combination lock to the storage unit. 
Officers used a consent form which they again explained to 
Thurman while at the storage unit. Id. Thurman did not claim 
that his detention was improper. 
In the present case, Flower's statements and actions were 
"taken in the shadow of authoritative control." See United 
States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977). The 
intimidating atmosphere created by the agents precluded the 
consent from being voluntary. The State did not meet its burden 
of establishing under the circumstances of this case that Flower 
voluntarily consented to a search of the safe. 
B. ANY CONSENT TO SEARCH THE SAFE WAS NOT 
SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED FROM THE INITIAL 
ILLEGALITY. 
If a criminal defendant shows that the evidence against 
him was obtained through an illegal search or seizure, the 
exclusionary rule requires that such evidence be suppressed. 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The exclusionary rule not 
only mandates that the illegally obtained evidence be suppressed, 
but also that any derivative evidence which was discovered by 
exploitation of the prior illegality, i.e. tainted evidence, be 
suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) . 
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"Information gained by law enforcement officers during an 
illegal search cannot be used in a derivative manner to obtain 
other evidence . . . ." United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236, 
243-44 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974). "The 
Fourth Amendment should not permit law enforcement to 'ratify 
their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a consent after the 
illegality has occurred.'" Thurman, 846 P.2d at 2363 (citing 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689). 
In order for the government to avoid suppression of the 
evidence, it must show that the causal connection between the 
police misconduct and the discovery of the derivative evidence 
has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone v. 
U.S., 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). The court in Arroyo stated: 
The basis for the second part of the two-part 
analysis is found in the "fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), 
which stated that a trial court must determine in 
such a case "'whether, granting establishment of 
the primary illegality, the evidence to which 
instant objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged 
of the primary taint.'" (cites omitted) The 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine has been 
extended to invalidate consents which, despite 
being voluntary, are nonetheless the exploitation 
of a prior police illegality. 
Arroyo at 690. The Arroyo court adopted the three factors 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590 (1975), for determining whether there has been sufficient 
attenuation to dissipate the taint: (1) the temporal proximity 
between the illegality and the challenged evidence; (2) the 
19 
presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown at 603-04; see also 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1273-74. Courts consider the totality of 
the circumstances to determine whether the attenuation of the 
taint is sufficient to permit the use of the derivative evidence. 
U.S. v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). 
The Supreme Court in Sims v. State Tax Com'n., 841 P.2d 6 
(Utah 1992), stated that upon considering the Brown factors: 
account should also be taken of whether the 
illegal seizure brought about police observation 
of the particular object they sought consent to 
search, whether the consent was volunteered 
rather than requested by the detaining officers, 
whether the detainee was made aware of the fact 
that he could decline to consent and thus prevent 
an immediate search, and whether the police 
purpose underlying the illegality was to obtain 
the consent. 
Id. at 10 (citing 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d) at 
193-194 (2d ed. 1987)). In a concurring opinion in Brown, 
Justice Powell stated that the exploitation analysis "always 
should be conducted with the deterrent purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule sharply in focus." 422 U.S. at 612. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the 
application of the three-part Thurman attenuation analysis in 
State v. Shoulderblade, Case No. 930518 (October 25, 1995) (per 
curiam). In Shoulderblade, the Court recognized that "[a] brief 
interval between an improper traffic detention and a consent to 
search does not always require suppression." Shoulderblade, 
slip op. at 6 (emphasis in original). Because it "is generally 
desirable and expected" that traffic stops will be brief, relying 
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on temporal proximity alone would "essentially establish a per se 
rule excluding all evidence obtained subsequent to an improper 
stop." Id. Therefore, all three Thurman factors must be 
considered. Although temporal proximity alone does not establish 
exploitation, "[a] brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment 
violation and consent often indicates exploitation because the 
effects of the misconduct have not had time to dissipate." Id. 
at 5-6. 
After considering temporal proximity, the Court 
considered "the purpose and flagrancy of the police conduct." 
Id. at 6. In analyzing this prong, the Court indicated that "the 
police purposely conducted a roadblock without justifiable 
reasons" and the 'goal of conducting the roadblock was "to stop 
cars and look for any criminal activity" and to obtain consent to 
search vehicles. Id. at 7. The Court reasoned that any 
incentive to seize on the ambiguity in the law regarding 
roadblocks and use that violation to obtain consent to search 
must "be removed by excluding evidence obtained thereby." Id. 
at 8 . 
Finally, the Court determined that there were no 
intervening circumstances which attenuated the illegal stop from 
the consent. Id. at 8. The Court indicated that intervening 
circumstances can include fleeing or "the independent discovery 
of additional inculpatory evidence giving the police probable 
cause to arrest." Id. 
In the present case, the first factor--the temporal 
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proximity between the illegal search and the consent--indicates 
exploitation. As was the case in Shoulderblade, in the present 
case, "the effects of the misconduct have not had time to 
dissipate." Id. at 6. 
The AP&P agents arrived at Flower's residence at about 
2:30 p.m. (R. 191, 193, 231), with the illegal protective sweep 
taking place shortly thereafter and lasting approximately ten 
minutes. R. 193. The agents were still present over two and 
one-half hours later when Flower arrived home around 5:15 p.m. 
R. 222, 258. They immediately questioned Flower regarding the 
contents of the safe. R. 258, 260. 
Immediately thereafter, Agent Metcalf conducted an 
illegal search of Flower's lunch box and then placed him under 
arrest. R. 225, 262-63. The officers took Flower into the 
kitchen portion of his house where he again was asked whether he 
would agree to a search of the safe. R.142, 226. Both the 
initial and subsequent affirmative responses that the officers 
could search the safe were given in close temporal proximity to 
the illegal sweep and illegal search of the lunch box. 
In addition, both affirmative responses were given during 
an ongoing official illegality. Therefore, regardless of the 
actual lapse of time, no time factor actually separated the 
illegality from the consent. See State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 
652, 656 (Utah App. 1992); see also United States v. Perez-
Castro, 606 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1979) (inculpatory statements on 
the morning following illegal arrest were not sufficiently 
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attenuated). In Brown, the Supreme Court found a two-hour lapse 
in time between the initial illegality and the consent was not 
sufficient to show attenuation. See also People v. Koniecki, 481 
N.E.2d 973, 980 (111. App. 1985) (consent obtained within two 
hours of illegal search and one hour of illegal arrest was not 
attenuated from illegality). 
The absence of any intervening circumstances also 
indicates that the officers exploited the illegality. During the 
two hours and thirty-five minutes between the illegal protective 
sweep and the first consent to search the safe, the four AP&P 
agents waited at Flower's residence for his arrival home from 
work. No intervening circumstances occurred which would 
attenuate the consent from the illegal search. 
Nor were there independent intervening circumstances 
between the illegal protective sweep and illegal search of the 
lunch pail and the second consent. Officers initially questioned 
Flower about the scales, marijuana residue and contents of the 
safe as the result of the illegal sweep. This initial 
questioning led directly to Flower's initial affirmative response 
that officers could open the safe. The illegal search of the 
lunch box followed and led directly to the illegal arrest and 
subsequent affirmative response. No independent circumstances 
intervened to break the chain of events from the illegal search 
of the lunch box or earlier illegal sweep. 
The lack of intervening circumstances in this case 
contrasts with the existence of intervening circumstances in 
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Thurman. See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1274. Unlike the situation in 
Thurman, the intimidation and confusion had not abated when 
officers asked to search the safe in this case. Indeed, the 
request was made almost immediately after Flower arrived. Flower 
was not advised of his Miranda rights before the first "consent." 
He was handcuffed and had exercised his right to silence when 
officers requested that he consent to a search. In addition, 
Flower did not volunteer to allow the agents to search the safe; 
instead, the agents requested that Flower consent to a search. 
Flower's "consent" to search the safe arose from an 
unbroken chain of events which began with the illegal sweep of 
the house. Had the officers not seen the scales and residue, 
they would not have initially confronted Flower as they did. Nor 
would they have remained at the home for over two hours waiting 
for Flower to return. Under these circumstances, no intervening 
circumstances served to dissipate the taint of the illegal 
searches. 
The final factor to be examined is the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct. This "purpose and 
flagrancy" factor bears directly on the deterrent value of 
suppression. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263. While the agents 
claimed that the purpose of the ad hoc protective sweep of 
Flower's residence was to determine whether or not there were 
third persons in the home who might pose a threat to the AP&P 
agents' safety, it appears that the agents were also looking for 
any evidence which they could use against Kelly or anyone else in 
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the house. 
The agents waited for Flower in an attempt to gain 
further evidence. They then searched his lunch box in an attempt 
to find more incriminating evidence. Both the illegal search of 
Flower's room and the illegal search of the lunch box appear to 
have been an effort to facilitate a search for evidence and 
deprive Flower of his rights. 
The officers purposely searched the room and later 
purposely searched the lunch box. The circumstances are similar 
to those in Shoulderblade in that the officers conducted the 
searches "without justifiable reasons." See Id. at 7. The 
officers' actions while at Flower's home indicate that the 
purpose of their conduct was to obtain consent or otherwise 
search the home. The incentive in this case to violate the 
Fourth Amendment "is precisely the type of incentive that must be 
removed by excluding evidence obtained." Id. at 7-8. 
The four agents were well trained and should have known 
that their actions were not authorized by law. "'The greatest 
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, 
well-meaning but without understanding.'" State v. Sims, 808 
P.2d 141, 151 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)). 
All three of the Arroyo/Thurman/Shoulderblade factors 
indicate that the officers obtained consent in this case by 
exploiting the illegality. The State failed to establish that 
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the taint of the illegality was purged. The contents of the safe 
must therefore be suppressed. 
REASONS WHY ORAL ARGUMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED 
AND OPINION ISSUED 
The issues raised in this case further refine the 
analysis for determining whether a consent to search is voluntary 
and attenuated from the initial illegality, as required by State 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this (stL day of November, 1995. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
MATTHEW G. NIELSEN / 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this itL day of 
November, 1995. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED this day of November, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Art. I, § 14 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
History: Const. 1896. Liquor, search, seizure and forfeiture, 
Cross-References. — Controlled Sub- § 32A-13-103. 
stances Act, search warrants, § 58-37-10. 





[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
GROVE L. FLOWER, 
Defendant. 
CaseNo.921901772FS 
Judge John A. Rokich 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. On or about September 14, 1992, Adult Probation and Parole Agent 
Arthur Street received a complaint that a parolee by the name of Kevin Kelley had been 
involved in an aggravated sexual assault. Mr. Street contacted Keliey's parole officer 
Steve Metcalf and they decided to go to Mr. Keliey's address to conduct a home visit. 
Agents Street and Metcalf were joined by Agents Hauraund and Kennington who had 
previously supervised Kelley while he was on parole. 
2. Agents Hauraund and Kennington had conducted a previous home visit 
with parolee Kelley on February 24, 1992. At the beginning of this home visit Kelley 
was asked by the agents if anyone else was in the house. Kelley denied having anyone in 
003C7 
the house with him. The agents heard noises from a back bedroom and discovered a man 
hiding in the back bedroom. This incident was resolved without any violence. 
3. Parolee Kelley had a past history of violent criminal behavior including 
aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault charges. Kennington, Hauraund, Metcalf 
and Street knew that Kelley had hidden a person at his residence before and had lied 
about the person to the parole agents, they also knew that Kelley had a past record of 
violence. Kelley's parole agreement provided that the agents could search his residence if 
they had reasonable suspicion that a probation violation had been committed by Kelley. 
4. Parolee Kelley had reported to the Parole Department that the only 
persons living at his residence at 4256 South 4940 West was his wife, Donna Kelley. The 
agents had no knowledge on September 14, 1992, that any other persons lived in the 
house. 
4(a). In actuality, Kelley was renting a room from Grove Flower. 
5. The Parole Agents went to Kelley's house at 4256 South 4940 West in 
Salt Lake County on September 14, 1992. Upon arrival Agents Metcalf and Street 
approached the front door while agents Hauraund and Kennington went around back to 
prevent anyone from leaving through a back exit. 
6. While in the back of the residence agents Hauraund and Kennington 
noticed a Pit Bull Terrier on the back yard of the residence. The Pit Bull would run to the 
back door. The Pit Bull did this several times causing Agents Kennington and Hauraund 
to believe that someone may have been in the house. Agents Street and Metcalf had 
knocked on the front door of the house and had received no response. 
7. Kelley arrived at the house a few minutes after the agents had knocked 
on the door. Kelley had obviously been in a physical confrontation, he had a black eye 
and a laceration on the back of his head. The agents identified themselves and the reason 
for their visit. Kelley asked if they could talk about this inside the house away from the 
view of the neighbors and invited the agents inside the house. When the agents and 
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view of the neighbors and invited the agents inside the house. When the agents and 
Kelley arrived at the front door the agents asked Kelley if anyone was in the house and he 
indicated he didn?t think so but that he was not sure. 
8. Agents Kennington and Metcalf accompanied Kelley upstairs while 
Agents Street and Hauraund testified that they proceeded downstairs to conduct a 
protective sweep. They did not discuss the protective sweep among themselves. 
9. During the protective sweep Agent Street observed a set of scales with 
marijuana residue on them and a gun locker with marijuana residue in front of it in the 
downstairs south east corner bedroom. Agent Hauraund had not observed the residue or 
scales in his sweep of the room and closet. Agent Street entered the bedroom after Agent 
Hauraund had already looked in the room. Agent Hauraund observed a box of 
ammunition in the kitchen area upstairs. 
10. After the protective sweep was finished the agents asked Kelley who 
was using the Southeast basement bedroom. He replied that it was used by Grove 
Flower. The agents made telephone calls about obtaining a search warrant. 
11. At approximately 5:15 p.m., Grove Flower was dropped off at the 
residence by a vehicle. Agents Street and Metcalf were on the porch when Flower arrived 
home. They met Flower on the front yard and identified themselves and explained the 
reason for their visit. 
12. Agent Metcalf told Mr. Flower about finding the safe, scales and 
marijuana residue and mentioned "I sure would like to know what's in the safe." Mr. 
Flower responded by saying I'll tell you there is an eighth ounce of marijuana and some 
guns in the safe. Agent Metcalf asked permission to search inside the safe and Flower 
gave him permission to search. 
13. Given the fact that Flower had indicated that he owned firearms Agent 
Metcalf determined to do a Terry frisk on Flower. During the Terry frisk Flower set 
down a lunch pail on the hood of Kelleyfs truck. After setting the lunch pail down 
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Flower's son attempted to take the lunch box and Flower grabbed the lunch box in a 
protective fashion. Agent Metcalf took the lunch box and Flower stated "It's pot man." 
At that time Metcalf opened the lunch box and discovered it to contain one-half pound of 
marijuana. 
14. Flower was placed under arrest and was taken into the house. Where he 
was Mirandized. Flower invoked his Miranda Rights. Flower was asked if he would 
consent to a search of his safe, he gave his consent and reached into his pocket to retrieve 
a key to the safe. The agents terminated their efforts to obtain a search warrant. 
15. When the safe was opened two firearms, one-eighth ounce marijuana, 
psylocybin mushrooms, money and a ledger were found. 
From the foregoing Findings of Facts the Court makes the following 
conclusion of law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to 
believe that there was another individual in the house which posed a danger to them and 
therefore the protective sweep was not justified. The scales and marijuana fragments 
found during the protective sweep are suppressed. 
2. The officers search of the defendant's lunch box was not a valid Terry 
search nor was it a valid search incident to arrest. The contents of the lunch box are 
suppressed. 
3. The initial consent given by the defendant to search the safe when he 
was contacted in the front yard of the house was sufficiently attenuated from the 
protective sweep and was voluntary. The subsequent consent given by the defendant after 
his arrest and after his Miranda rights had been given to him was attenuated from the 
protective sweep and was voluntary. The search of the safe was a valid consent search 
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and the contents of the safe are not suppressed. 
DATED this /(J day of Aid t cL^ , 1994. 
BY THE COURT 
I The Honorable John A. Rokich 
*e of The Third District Court 
Approved as to form: 
h*t»,_vw 
Counsel for Defendant 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RICHARD G. HAMP, Bar No. 4048 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801)468-3422 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





GROVE L. FLOWER, : 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant. : 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, and good 
cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. The scales and marijuana fragments found during the protective sweep 
are suppressed; 
2. The marijuana found in the lunch box is suppressed; 
3. The firearms, marijuana, psylocybin mushrooms, money and ledger 
found in the safe are not suppressed. 
DATED this J^_ day of frlfrKCH 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
Tha Honorable John a. Rokich 
J^uage of The Third District Court 
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CERTIFICATE OF MATT TNG 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order, was mailed, postage prepaid and 
addressed as follows: 
Robert B. Breeze 
Attorney at law 
211 East 300 South, #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DATED this P<** day ofJaauafy, 1994. 
Michele R. Rowden, Sec. 
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